Russian Volunteers in
the German Wehrmacht in WorldWar II
by
Lt. Gen. Władysław Anders and Antonio Muňoz [ed.]
It is not known when and where exactly the first units of volunteers from the
USSR, and from the countries annexed by Russia after 1939, were organized to
fight against the Soviets on the German side. Their beginnings were shrouded in
great secrecy, for fear of Hitler who was categorically opposed to any form of
participation of Soviet citizens in the war against Russia. But needs of the
army on the Eastern Front, and the enthusiastic desire shown by hundreds of
captured and escaped officers, by thousands of Soviet soldiers, and by almost
the entire local population induced German commanders to accept the services of
volunteers to fight the Soviet regime even against the clear orders of the
Supreme Command. When the existence of numerous formations of Eastern volunteers
came to light with the passing of time, Hitler was unpleasantly surprised. The
hopeless military situation of the Reich forced him to approve this state of
affairs.
The creation of eastern volunteer formations was patronized - secretly, of
course - by the Section of Foreign Armies East of the Intelligence Department of
the Army General Staff, the so-called "Fremde Heere Ost" Section; Officers of
this section saw the importance of an anti-Soviet Russian Army fighting on the
German side and its possible effect on the outcome of the war. The idea was
fully appreciated also by the propaganda section of the Supreme Command, the
"Wehrmacht Propaganda IV," or WPrIV for short, which dealt with propaganda on
both sides of the eastern front and had under its control special camps for
selected prisoners who were being trained for active propaganda in psychological
warfare against Soviet Russia.
A number
of German generals also supported the organization of eastern volunteer
formations, but for a long time without success. In the autumn of 1941, Field
Marshal von Bock had sent to Hitler's Headquarters a detailed project for the
organization of a Liberation Army of some 200,000 Russian volunteers, and for
the formation of a local government in the province of Smolensk; It was returned
in November 1941 with the notation that "such thoughts cannot be discussed with
the Fuehrer," and that "politics are not the prerogatives of Army Group
Commanders." Of course, Field-Marshal Keitel, who wrote this notation, did not
show the project to Hitler [Wen Sie Verderben Wollen, pp. 82-83.].
The forerunner of the volunteer formations was a voluntary auxiliary service, of
a para-military character, which was started in the autumn of 1941 by the German
Commands on the front. On their own initiative, they organized auxiliary units
of various services, made up of Soviet deserters, prisoners, and volunteers from
among the local population. These so-called "Hilfswillige," or "Hiwi," were
employed as sentries, drivers, store- keepers, workers in depots, etc. The
experiment surpassed all expectations. In the spring of 1942 there were already
at least 200,000 of them in the rear of the German armies, and by the end of the
same year their number was allegedly near 1,000,000 [Soviet Opposition to
Stalin, p.45.].
The next step taken by the German Commands in the east behind Hitler's back was
the organization of voluntary military troops, called "Osttruppen," clad in
German uniforms and designed to guard communication lines, fight Soviet
partisans in the rear of the German armies, and sometimes even hold less
important sectors of the front. These troops seldom exceeded the strength of a
battalion. In the middle of 1942, there were already 6 such battalions in the
rear of Army Group Center alone.
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